We propose a cross-sectional time-series model to assess the impact of market liberalizations in emerging equity markets on the cost of capital, volatility, beta, and correlation with world market returns. Liberalizations are defined by regulatory changes, the introduction of depositary receipts and country funds, and structural breaks in equity capital flows to the emerging markets. We control for other economic events that might confound the impact of foreign speculators on local equity markets. Across a range of specifications, the cost of capital always decreases after a capital market liberalization with the effect varying between 5 and 75 basis points.
n/a n/a n/a n/a clustered in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Although such an event may be considered a prime candidate for testing the impact of increased foreign speculative activity, there are a number of factors that could confound this experiment. First, the investment restrictions may not have been binding. Second, liberalizations can take many different forms-relaxing currency controls, reducing foreign ownership restrictions, etc.,-and not all market reforms take place at the same time. This makes the choice of the "liberalization date" in Table I 
B.2. Country Funds
A closed-end country fund is an investment company that invests in a portfolio of assets in a foreign country (e.g., an emerging market) and issues a fixed number of shares domestically (e.g., in the United States). Each fund provides two distinct market-determined prices: the country fund's share price quoted on the market where it trades, and its net asset value determined by the prices of the underlying shares traded on the foreign market. Closed-end mutual funds were the original vehicles for foreign investment in emerging financial markets. For example, until the late 1980s the closed-end Mexico Fund was the only way U.S. investors could invest in the Mexican market. The Korea Fund partially opened up the Korean equity market to foreign investors in 1984, long before the capital market liberalizations of 1991. Table I presents the dates of the introduction of the first country fund for our sample of emerging markets.
Errunza, Senbet, and Hogan (1998) theoretically show that the introduction of country funds drives up the prices of local companies and reduces the cost of capital. The country fund essentially renders the local market partially integrated with global markets. These results hold even though the typical size of a country fund is very small relative to the total market capitalization of the emerging market. Using an event-study of returns around country fund launchings, Tandon (1997) presents empirical evidence that seems to support these claims.
B.3. American Depositary Receipts
American Depositary Receipts are rights to foreign shares that trade in dollars on a U.S. exchange or over-the-counter. Table I details the earliest ADR introduction for the emerging markets in our sample. ADRs overcome many of the investment restrictions, transaction costs, and informational problems associated with investing in foreign securities. For example, since ADRs are treated as U.S. securities in most legal situations, they enable mutual funds, pension funds, and other U.S. institutions to hold securities that are fungible with foreign shares.
The effects of ADRs on local stock market prices are theoretically similar to those of country funds (see Urias (1994) ). Importantly, local stocks that are correlated with the newly cross-listed security respond as well, even though they are not themselves cross-listed. That is, there are spill-over effects. A variety of empirical studies'-find mixed results, but mostly the local price effect of ADR introductions is positive.
B.4. Capital Flows
Arguably, the best measure of the foreign presence in an emerging market is the percentage of stocks held by foreign investors. However, the only available data are U.S. capital flows to emerging markets since 1985. These data are published monthly in the U.S. Treasury Bulletin. 2 We accumulate the capital flows to obtain an approximate measure of the ratio of U.S. ownership to market capitalization. The accumulation takes into account the local market equity appreciation realized by the U.S. investor. That is, the dollar position of U.S. investors in emerging market i is Owni,t = Flowi,t + Owni,t-I(1 + R?,t), where Flowi, t is the net capital flow in period t and Ri t is the market i return in U.S. dollar terms from the IFC. The last column in Table I reports the U.S. percentage ownership at the end of 1995, which is largest in Mexico and Argentina.
These data are not without problems. First, although for most countries portfolio flows were zero before 1985, for others, not knowing the initial foreign ownership (in 1985) makes the resulting estimates hard to interpret. Second, it may be the case that foreigners hold portfolios different from the IFC index. Kang and Stulz (1997) show that foreign investors are more likely to invest in securities that are large and well known. The IFC indexes pos-1 See Foerster and Karolyi (1999) , Miller (1999) , the survey in Karolyi (1998), and Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1997, 1998 ) for studies at the individual firm level and see Bekaert (1995) for a study at the market level.
2 Table CM -V-4 reports on a monthly basis foreigners' gross purchases of foreign stocks (U.S. sales, column 7) and foreigners' gross sales of foreign stocks (U.S. purchases, column 14). See Tesar and Werner (1995b) for an early analysis and see Hamao and Mei (1997) for a study of the effects of foreign investment on Japanese equity pricing. sess some advantage here over more comprehensive local indexes because of the IFC's focus on large, relatively liquid securities. Third, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. investors may invest in emerging markets through third countries, like the U.K. Hence, the large flows to the U.K. could partially reflect emerging market investment that we are unable to track. Fourth, the relation between the cost of capital and foreign ownership may be nonlinear. That is, stocks will be priced differently when foreigners become the marginal investors. It is not clear at what level of foreign ownership this occurs.
Our approach is to test for a structural break in the U.S. ownership series to identify when the foreign investors' presence in the market increases significantly. We employ the endogenous break point tests detailed in Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998). Briefly, the test searches for a break in the mean within the context of an autoregressive model for the ownership series. Apart from a structural break test, the procedure yields a break date with a 90 percent confidence interval.3 We report the results in the fourth column of Table I .
II. Measuring the Cost of Capital
The cost of capital is notoriously difficult to measure. The problems are compounded in our setting, since we believe that the cost of capital changes when markets integrate with world capital markets and that the process of integration is gradual. In such an environment, it is very difficult to use average returns to measure changes in the cost of capital. However, a change in the marginal investor and the different valuation it implies should have discrete effects on the price level of stocks (see also Korajczyk (1996) for similar arguments). Hence, it is likely that a technique exploiting information in price levels may be more powerful. Whereas Henry (2000), in effect, attempts to measure the discrete price change directly by estimating the abnormal return during the liberalization period, we use aggregate dividend yields to measure cost of capital changes.
Why dividend yields? First, shocks to prices should dominate its variation over time. Second, the dividend yield is intricately linked to the cost of capital in many asset pricing models, as we demonstrate below. Third, the dividend yield is directly measurable-that is, it need not be preestimatedand is a stationary random variable.4 That is, in most rational expectations models, a transversality condition ensures that the price-dividend ratios (and hence the dividend yields) are stationary. The capital market liberalization process can be viewed as a structural break that renders dividend yields nonstationary over the full sample. Our empirical approach only requires them to be stationary before and after the liberalization. In the United States, dividend yields have recently displayed a downward trend that is often partially ascribed to the marked increase in share repurchases, constituting an alternative means of dispensing cash to shareholders. Such repurchases are minor or entirely absent in emerging markets.6
A. Dividend Yields versus Average Returns as a Cost of Capital Measure
Consider first a simple example. Assume rational expectations and a discounted dividend model for the stock price, Pt:
where Dt are the dividends and at is the discount factor, and where the usual transversality condition holds. Let fO, before liberalization; 1i+ -A v 1, after liberalization.
The x superscript indicates different measures of liberalization (see below).
We further assume that the liberalization is a one-time, unexpected event. When the market is segmented, the required rate of return is constant and equal to r. When the market opens up, the required rate of return drops to r. We can represent this simple model for expected returns as 8t ~~~~~~~~~~~ t1 + r --qYtx (2 where -j r -r, the drop in the cost of capital. Under this set of assumptions, the relation between the change in the dividend yield Dt/Pt -Dt/Pt and the change in the cost of capital -j depends on the dividend process.
In the standard Gordon model, which assumes that EtDti-(1 + g)EtDt 1+i, this relation is virtually one to one. It is straightforward to show that
This break complicates the interpretation of the notoriously powerless standard unit root and stationarity tests applied to dividend yields. This is especially the case for emerging markets which have short samples to begin with. A whole battery of tests yields the typical conclusion that it is about equally hard to reject the null of a unit root as to reject the null of stationarity. A Bayesian unit root test (Sims and Uhlig (1991)) overwhelmingly rejects the presence of a unit root in emerging market dividend yields. 6 We searched the IFC database for negative changes in shares outstanding. Most of the negative numbers were traced to rights issues that were not fully subscribed. There is little evidence of share repurchases in emerging markets. Indeed, it is not uncommon for repurchases to be illegal in many emerging markets. This simple model fits the data very well.7 We calibrate the model parameters to annual U.S. data on real dividend growth, dividend yields, and real stock returns for the S&P 500. Appendix A reveals a close match with the first three moments of these series. For example, our model generates a standard deviation of 22.9 percent for real stock returns (20.0 percent in the data) and an average dividend yield of 5.0 percent (4.4 percent in the data). Is the change in the dividend yield still a good proxy for the change in the cost of capital after a market liberalization? When expected returns are varying through time, dividend yields forecast both future dividend changes and future returns. Time variation in expected returns may therefore induce changes in dividend yields that do not reflect a change in the long-term cost of capital brought about by market integration. Such change is nevertheless likely to be near permanent and to have a larger effect on dividend yields than a transitory change in expected returns. Ideally, we would introduce a variable in our regressions that controls for time-variation in expected returns. The fact that this time-variation may be tracked by different variables before versus after liberalization (local versus global information variables) complicates this task. Nevertheless, since the change in the cost of capital induced by market integration is near permanent, investigating dividend yields is again superior to investigating returns.
What makes dividend yields superior in small samples is their lack of variability relative to returns. It is difficult to illustrate this superiority analytically given the persistence in dividend yields and returns. In Appendix A, we describe a Monte Carlo experiment that illustrates the relative performance of the two measures of cost of capital changes (average returns before and after the break versus changes in dividend yields) in the context of the present value model. We simulate samples of 40 data points (years) with the cost of capital (as measured by q) falling by two percent after 20 years. The results can be summarized as follows:
1. The distribution of the changes in average simple returns is so spread out that there is a larger than 10 percent probability one concludes that the cost of capital increased by more than five percent although it actually dropped by 2.19 percent in the population.8 Dividend yields virtually always decrease. 2. When we investigate experiments where average returns just before liberalization are unusually high or low, the return measure is severely biased, whereas the dividend yield shows very little bias. This suggests that when there is endogeneity bias (for example, governments choosing to liberalize when it appears most advantageous to them, such as in times of depressed stock prices), the dividend yield measure is robust but the average return measure is not. 3. Cross-sectional pooling dramatically improves the performance of both the return and dividend yield measures, making the dividend yield measure extremely accurate.
B. Caveats

B.1. Growth Opportunities versus Cost of Capital Changes
Despite the gain in accuracy that the use of dividend yields brings, their use also creates some potential interpretation problems. First, the change in the dividend yield may overestimate the cost of capital because of its link to economic growth. A liberalization may enhance the growth prospects for a country (see Obstfeld (1994) (2000), we also use excess returns as the dependent variable in our regression analysis. When dividend yields drop by a large amount but excess returns do not, the dividend yield change is likely driven by an improvement in growth opportunities. Nevertheless, Section B of Appendix A shows that it remains the case that increases in average returns often are still consistent with a population decrease in the cost of capital.
Third, our experiments generally confirm that the response of dividend yields to cost of capital changes is indeed near linear (see Appendix A). Hence, we can simply attempt to "measure" the change in growth opportunities (for example, by reporting increased long-run GDP growth) and subtract it from the total dividend yield change to estimate the change in the cost of capital. We deliver a number of statistics on changes in growth opportunities after liberalizations in Section IV.A.5 below.
Fourth, since the linearity of dividend yield responses may not be general if other structural parameters change (e.g., dividend growth or return volatility), we also provide a calibration exercise of our structural model before and after liberalization, which yields direct estimates of changes in expected returns and dividend growth for an "average" emerging market (see Section C of Appendix A).
B.2. Corporate Finance Issues
Corporate finance theory also suggests that dividend yields may decrease for reasons other than a decrease in the cost of capital. If emerging market firms truly enjoy better growth opportunities after liberalizations, they may choose to distribute fewer dividends and invest more. Henry (1999) documents increased aggregate investment after financial market liberalizations. Of course, this increase may also be due to decreases in the cost of capital.
B.3. Other Caveats
Our analysis so far assumes there is one unexpected liberalization. When liberalizations are anticipated, prices adjust before the actual liberalization occurs. If some uncertainty remains about the liberalization, a positive price movement may still occur on the actual date. Since returns are likely to be positive in the period between anticipation and actual liberalization, expected liberalizations are another reason to be wary of the use of returns for testing the cost of capital effect. We attempt to take anticipated liberalizations into account in our measurement of the liberalization variable Ytj. One of our measures also reflects the gradual nature of capital market liberalizations.
Finally, emerging markets may be inefficient and illiquid and the arrival of foreign investors may enhance efficiency and liquidity, thereby reducing the cost of equity capital. We include control variables that measure stock market development which may partially capture this indirect liberalization effect.
III. Econometric Methodology
A. Defining the Liberalization Variables
We introduce two liberalization dummies, one based on the capital market liberalization dates and the other based on the capital flow break points in Table I . We split our sample into four parts: PRE (36 to seven months prior to liberalization), DURING (six months prior to three months after liberalization), POST (four months after liberalization to 34 months postliberalization), and AFTER (35 months after liberalization to the end of the sample). The PRE and POST periods are symmetric in duration. When liberalizations are preannounced or anticipated by market participants, expected returns may change some time before the liberalization date. By excluding nine months around the liberalization date, our procedure is hopefully robust to small errors in the dating of the liberalization. Moreover, we check the sensitivity of our results to the length and structure of the DURING window.
Our other measure uses launching data on ADRs and country funds to construct three indexes. First, At, counts the number of ADR issues in the United States or the U.K. for country i over time. Hence, for some countries this index may equal the zero vector. Second, CFt i similarly "counts" the country fund launchings. Finally, Lt i = At,i + CFt i. When attempting to measure how the cost of capital is affected by changes in these indexes, we face a number of immediate technical problems. 
where 0 < A < 1. The size of A determines how fast the additional impact of further launchings declines. Figure 1 shows what happens for three different As assuming the index goes from 1 to 20 continuously (in reality, Ytx will be a step function). As can be seen, for very low As, the additional issues generate almost no additional effect. Second, as indicated above, it is important to account for rational expectations of the market participants. Fortunately, for some ADRs, we have the actual announcement dates, using information provided by Miller (1999),9 9 When announcement dates are unavailable, a proxy is used. For ADRs listed on the major stock exchanges (such as the NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX), a four-month period prior to the actual initial public offering (IPO) date is used; for OTC ADRs, a one-month period prior to the IPO is used; and for 144AADRs, a two-month period prior to the IPO period is used. These are estimated from median announcement leads on the ADRs for which we have both announcement and listing dates. where ppre is the correlation between the local excess return and the world market excess return before the liberalization. Consequently, whereas we still estimate a country invariant y, the liberalization effect is countryspecific and increases the lower is the correlation with the world market before the liberalization. In particular, the effect is zero if the preliberalization correlation is perfect and y if the preliberalization correlation is -1. In another experiment, we weigh the dummies by the postliberalization fiveyear average value of foreign ownership in the case of the "Official Liberalizations" and "First Sign" measures and by the change in the five-year average of foreign ownership post-versus preliberalization for the capital flow break regressions. If the extent of foreign ownership significantly alters the cost of capital effect, y ought to be large in such a regression.
Finally, in a previous version of the paper, we checked the robustness of our results to country-specific liberalization effects. To maintain power, we estimated one country at a time. That is, in the first regression, there was a country-specific coefficient for Argentina but the liberalization effect was restricted to be the same for the other countries. We found that the countryspecific coefficients were rarely significant and generally insignificantly different from the overall coefficient.
C. Estimation Issues
We perform generalized least squares accounting for groupwise (countryby-country) heteroskedasticity, with a Prais-Winsten correction for serial correlation since it is unlikely that our control variables capture all serial correlation in dividend yields (and similarly in volatility below). We do not correct for potential endogeneity problems. If the government liberalizes when it is most needed (the cost of capital is temporarily high), policy endogeneity makes our estimates upper bounds on the true response. We also do not correct for correlation across residuals of different countries. First, given the low correlations between emerging market returns, it is unlikely that we will gain much efficiency by doing so. Second, it is technically nontrivial since the number of observations differs across countries.
D. Control Variables
The control variables generally fall into four categories: asset concentration, stock market development/economic integration, microstructure effects, and finally macroeconomic influences and political risk.
The asset concentration category includes the number of stocks in each of the country indexes followed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). We also investigate a modified Herfindahl index of concentration. This index ranges from zero (equal market capitalization) to one (one dominant firm).
The stock market development/economic integration category includes two macroeconomic measures and one financial measure. The macroeconomic variables are the capitalization of the stock market relative to the country's GDP and the size of the trade sector (exports plus imports) relative to GDP. Our financial variable is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the stock returns within each index (at every month). As an economy becomes more developed and the stock market more mature, there is often less reliance on one particular sector (the correlation between stocks decreases), which increases the cross-sectional standard deviation.
We use cross-sectional standard deviation also as our main microstructure variable since other data, such as turnover and the number of stocks traded, are only available for a portion of the sample. This variable potentially wears two hats. In the model of Ross (1989), it measures the amount of information being revealed about the stocks traded in a particular country. However, as indicated above, it may also potentially reveal information about the diversity of the industrial sector. To account for these two interpretations in the volatility, correlation, and beta models, we also allow for the cross-sectional standard deviation to interact with the relative level of market development measured by the market capitalization to GDP ratio minus its cross-sectional mean. If MC//GDPt < (MCt/GDPt) and the regression coefficient on the interaction variable is positive, then an increased cross-sectional standard deviation negatively affects market volatility. If MC'/GDPt > (MCt/GDPt), then the derivative of volatility with respect to the cross-sectional standard deviation is positive, which is what is predicted by the information flow model of Ross.
The final variables are linked to the condition of the macroeconomy. We examine the standard deviation of exchange rate changes as well as the average inflation rates. We also include a variable designed to proxy for political risk: the Institutional Investor country credit rating. Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996b) find that the Institutional Investor measure has high correlation with more direct measures of political risk that are available over shorter periods. Table II presents country specific means of all the variables that we examine as well as some characteristics of the cross-sectional distribution of these variables. The large outliers in the inflation rates for Argentina and Brazil motivate a log transformation of the inflation data. It is also interesting to note the skewed nature of the market capitalization to GDP dis- tribution. There is relatively little difference between the first quartile and the median, but there is a sharp jump when moving from the median to the third quartile.
The role of control variables is complex in our framework. The regression that we specify in equation (12) (13) where Os are the structural parameters, Ytx is the liberalization indicator, Adt is the log-dividend growth, and rt represents the expected rate of return. If our control variables are correlated with structural changes in Adt and rt, we may expect their data-generating process to change after financial liberalizations and we may find significant coefficients d (0) and f(0). We explore this below by examining whether control variables break around liberalization dates and whether they capture future growth opportunities. We also run regressions without control variables and we run "structural regressions," allowing for breaks in all the control variables. An interesting and relevant special case is when dividend growth follows a white noise process, not an unreasonable approximation to the dividend growth rate process, and expected returns are constant. In that case, c (0) and d (0) are zero and, hence, the coefficient on Adt is also zero. As a consequence, any change in growth opportunities is absorbed in the constant b (0), as is the change in the cost of capital. Given our previous Monte Carlo experiments, which suggest that the effect of growth opportunities on dividend yields is approximately linear, the change in the cost of capital would then be derived as b (0)YtX minus the change in the dividend growth, as we suggested earlier.
Finally, changes in control variables may be indirectly related to liberalizations, as in the case when foreign investment helps to improve liquidity and efficiency in the local market or amplifies the beneficial effect of a trade liberalization or macroeconomic reforms. After all, capital market liberalizations are often part of a broader reform package (see also Henry (2000)).
More specifically, what matters is the general stock market development and openness of a country, which is proxied by a number of our right-handside variables.
To assess the economic significance of a liberalization from the regressions, we trace the effect on an emerging market of moving from a poorly developed capital market with poor economic performance to a median country following a capital market liberalization. To do this, we examine the cross-sectional distribution of all of the explanatory variables. We consider a change from the 25th percentile to the median for the number of companies in the IFC index, the size of the trade sector, the cross-sectional standard deviation, the country credit rating, and the country's equity capitalization. We look at a change from the 75th percentile to the median for the concentration ratio, inflation, and foreign currency volatility. We allow for a capital market liberalization.
We dissect the cumulative effect into three groups. Stock market development includes the number of companies in the index, the concentration ratio, the cross-sectional volatility, market capitalization, and the interaction between capitalization and cross-sectional volatility. Macroeconomic development includes the inflation rate, foreign exchange rate volatility, the size of the trade sector, and the political risk rating. Finally, the financial liberalization effect is constructed from the difference between the post-and preliberalization indicator variables. We construct such economic impact graphs for dividend yields, volatilities, correlations, and betas.
W Empirical Results: Cost of Capital A. Regression Results
A.1. No Control Variables
Table III presents our estimates of the dividend yield model without control variables. This is roughly analogous to looking at mean dividend yields before and after liberalizations.
Panels A through C report the models for ADR and Country Fund introduction indexes with a single choice of the impact parameter, A = 0.90. To arrive at this value, we grid search 17 different values of this parameter, from 0.01 to 0.99, and record the likelihood function value.11 The size of A determines the effect of additional ADRs or Country Funds. High values, such as 0.90, imply that additional introductions have important effectsthat is, liberalization is a gradual process. For the dividend yield regressions, the likelihood is always maximized at 0.99. For the other variables (excess returns, betas, correlations, and volatility), the maximum occurs at a value higher than 0.80 in all but two cases. Although in many cases the likelihood function appears quite flat, the overwhelming evidence points toward high As (gradual liberalization). We impose A = 0.90 for all of our estimations.
The coefficient on the ADR announcement index in Table III , Panel A, is negative, implying that ADR introductions reduce the cost of capital. The coefficient is about 2.7 standard errors from zero. We also present results based on ADR effective dates (dates that the ADRs were launched in contrast to the announcement dates). The coefficient is also negative and two standard errors from zero. In sum, the weighted regressions suggest that countries with low correlations before the liberalization and/or higher degrees of foreign ownership (in the postliberalization period) experience larger reductions in the cost of capital. Strikingly, the cost of capital continues to decrease in the AFTER period, which is consistent with a pattern of very gradual liberalization.
A.2. Allowing for Control Variables
The problem with examining dividend yields before and after a liberalization is that the change may be linked to phenomena unrelated to the liberalization. There are a number of interesting patterns when the control variables enter the regressions. The results in Table IV show that their presence decreases the liberalization effect but not by much. In terms of statistical significance, the only effect is on the official liberalization measures, where the cost of capital change is no longer significant at the 5 percent level, but remains significant at the 10 percent level.
The log of the number of companies in the stock index enters with a negative coefficient (the more companies, the more developed the market, and the lower the dividend yield). The coefficient, with few exceptions, is borderline significant. The concentration ratio also enters with a negative, but insignificant, coefficient. This implies that as some large firms emerge in a country, the dividend yield decreases. It is possible that this result is being driven by privatizations in a few countries and we indeed find that asset concentration tends to increase after privatizations (see priv_conc.htm).
The size of the trade sector, which is a development indicator, enters strongly with a negative coefficient in all regressions. As the size of the trade sector increases, the dividend yield decreases. The cross-sectional standard deviation is also important in each regression. More industrial diversity (suggesting development of the market) tends to decrease the dividend yield. Indeed, this variable enters the regression with coefficients six standard errors from zero.12 The political risk indicator fails to enter any of the regressions with a significant coefficient.
Finally, the macroeconomic climate variables have mixed effects. The volatility of the foreign exchange rate changes enters with a negative coefficient that is difficult to explain. However, inflation enters with a close to significant positive coefficient indicating that lower inflation is associated with lower dividend yields. It is possible that the inclusion of three variables, proxying for macroeconomic stability (inflation, exchange rate variability, and credit ratings) leads to the anomalous sign for exchange rate variability.
A.3. Interpretation Issues When Using Control Variables
We consider two issues. First, privatizations may affect both certain control variables and the liberalization effect we measure. Second, the control variables may be impacted by the capital market liberalization.
Policymakers may strategically time the liberalization process in an attempt to maximize the revenues from privatizations. This potential correlation between liberalizations and privatizations may affect our results through 12 Nevertheless, omitting this variable has little impact on our results, both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude. This variable is also significant in the excess return regression with the opposite sign; see ret_control.htm for some additional tables and an interpretation of this result. To examine this, we collected data from the World Bank on all privatizations in emerging markets since 1988. This includes 14 of our 20 markets. We measure privatization in two ways. First, we examine the year-by-year value of privatization divided by market capitalization at t -1; this value is kept constant throughout the year. Second, we use the indicator variable suggested by Perotti and van Oijen (1997) that comes on at the peak year of the privatization program and stays on to the end of the sample. Hence, the first measure looks for temporary effects of privatizations, whereas the second measure considers permanent effects.
With these two measures of privatization activity, we conduct a number of experiments that are fully described and documented on our Internet site. Here we offer only a brief summary of our findings. First, we reestimate the Table IV regressions interacting the value of privatizations with the number of companies, the cross-sectional standard deviation, and the concentration ratio, which are our stock market development variables. The p-values of the Wald tests for the decrease in dividend yields are not substantially affected and the estimated cost of capital change does not differ materially from our estimate in Table IV. Second, we explore in more detail the relation between dividend yields and privatizations using various regression specifications. We find evidence of a weak negative relation between dividend yields and privatizations, which is strong when Perotti and van Oijen (1997) dummy variables are used. Our result of a more significant permanent effect is consistent both with Perotti and van Oijen who postulate that privatization signals political commitment to market-oriented policy reform, including financial liberalization, and with Henry (2000) who finds privatizations have a positive valuation effect.
Finally, we introduce the value of privatizations directly into the set of Table IV regressions with the liberalization indicator variables. The privatization variable is never significant. We conclude that our main results are not affected by privatizations.
A second issue that we face is the possibility that the control variables break at the liberalization dates. The resulting misspecification of our regression model is potentially important if any of these variables are correlated with the cost of capital or with growth opportunities. Table V presents an analysis of whether the control variables are different before and after Official Liberalizations, the First Sign, and the Capital Flows Break.
The results suggest that some of the control variables break. In all three liberalization definitions, the number of companies in the index increases significantly. In two of the three definitions, the concentration ratio signif- icantly decreases. There is weaker evidence of an increase in the crosssectional standard deviation and decreases in inflation rates. Credit ratings significantly increase after the capital flows breaks.
Interestingly, the variables most obviously potentially correlated with growth opportunities or expected returns, such as trade sector to GDP and country credit rating, do not break, lessening the need for a structural regression as in equation (13). A possible exception here is the crosssectional standard deviation, which may be an imperfect risk proxy in the more developed markets (see footnote 12). Moreover, since every control variable requires the estimation of five separate coefficients for the various windows, structural regressions may lack power. For example, when we estimate the structural counterpart of the regression with the First Sign liberalization measure, there are virtually no significant coefficients left. We fare somewhat better with the Official Liberalization measure regression (see div_struct.htm), where the regression detects a number of significant changes in the relation between the control variables and dividend yields induced by liberalizations. One example is that an increase in the number of companies leads to a smaller decrease in dividend yields BEFORE, DURING, and AFTER the liberalization compared to the early period. This is consistent with this relation being due to stock market development. Overall, however, the PRE, DURING, and POST coefficients fail to be significant. This is also true for the liberalization dummies. Although the decrease in the cost of capital now appears much larger, it is no longer statistically significant.
A.4. Liberalization and Returns
The simulation analysis shows that it is difficult to detect a change in the cost of capital by examining returns. This motivates our focus on dividend yields. Nevertheless, we might learn something from examining the behavior of the returns around liberalizations. Although this need not be generally true, in our structural model, changes in average returns are in fact not contaminated by changes in growth opportunities.
Table VI presents analysis analogous to Table IV except that excess returns are examined rather than dividend yields. In the gradual liberalization models, the coefficient on the introduction variable is negative for all three liberalization indexes. This implies a decrease in expected returns after liberalizations. However, it is not significantly different from zero. For the effective ADR case, the coefficient is 1.4 standard errors below zero.
In the liberalization indicator regressions, the message is different. In the First Sign regressions, average returns significantly increase (at the 5 percent level). For the Official Liberalization, the increase is only significant at the 10 percent level in the unweighted regression. In the Capital Flow Break regression, there is a small, insignificant decrease in average returns. These results remain largely unaltered when we introduce control variables in the regressions (see ret_control.htm). The gradual liberalization measures have Why is it that the gradual liberalization regressions are suggesting a negative impact on expected returns and that some liberalization indicators are suggesting a positive impact on returns? One possibility is that the timing of the liberalization indicators is a problem. Indeed, in some cases in Table VI , we see a decrease in average returns in the AFTER period.
We investigate the sensitivity of our results to the definition of the DUR-ING variable-which is defined as six months prior to a liberalization date to three months after. As indicated before, the DURING variable captures the period during which the "return to integration" is realized. That is, when markets open up, capital investment flows in and prices increase as investors take advantage of the diversification benefits. However, in the longer term, given the higher price level, expected returns should be lower than in the preliberalization period. How long the transition period lasts is hard to say. Henry (2000), who focuses on the excess returns during the liberalization, uses an eight-month window leading up to the implementation of the liberalization. Our analysis that allows for gradual liberalization suggests a very long period.
In results reported on the Internet, we present the sensitivity of the returns regressions to different windows for the DURING variable (see ret_win-dow.htm). The results can be summarized as follows. First, the "return to integration" (DURING-PRE) ranges from 0.20 to 2.50 percent per month using official liberalizations, which is smaller than Henry's (1999a) findings. However, Henry examines 12 countries rather than 20 and his liberalization dates are not always the same as ours. Second, the results on returns depend on the definition of the liberalization variable, with small, insignificant increases for Official Liberalizations; a U-shaped pattern in the liberalization coefficients for the First Sign regression (PRE is low, DUR-ING and POST are higher, and AFTER is low); and insignificant decreases in returns for the Capital Flow Break point regressions.
Whereas we find a consistent decrease in dividend yields, excess returns may increase or decrease from the pre-to postliberalization period depending on the specification. In the longer-term, average returns appear to be lower. Although the noisiness of returns most probably is the underlying factor in all of these results, there is another possibility. Our dividend yield decrease may reflect primarily an improvement in growth opportunities, leaving little room for cost of capital decreases.
A.5. Is It Growth or Lower Cost of Capital?
In the simple present value model, dividend yields are linked to both expected returns and growth opportunities. Some of our regressions could be picking up changes in growth opportunities rather than changes in the cost of capital. We conduct three exercises to address this issue. We also investigate more direct measures of expected economic growth. Though data are available only from 1984, the International Country Risk Guide's Economic (ICRGE) rating variable is supposed to reflect future growth prospects. We find that the ICRGE rating predicts economic growth and enters the regression with a positive coefficient (higher rating, better prospects) which is 2.4 standard errors from zero (see GDP_ICRGE.htm).14 We use the ICRGE as an additional variable in our regressions to control for growth prospects.
When we reestimate the dividend regressions with the ICRGE as an extra control variable, the results are similar to those in Table IV -even though the sample is shorter (see div_ICRGE.htm). Dividend yields decrease from PRE to POST and even more sharply from PRE to AFTER for Official Liberalizations. The change is significant at the 10 percent level. A similar pattern is found in the First Sign regressions, although the liberalization effect is now smaller, as would be expected if the original decrease we found is partially due to growth opportunities now controlled for by the ICRGE variable. The dividend yield change is also no longer significant. Second, we attempt to directly measure the change in growth rates after liberalization. In a country-by-country examination, growth increases in 14 of 19 countries that experienced a liberalization. In a pooled GLS regression of GDP growth rates on the Official Liberalization indicator variable, the coefficient is positive and three standard errors from zero (see GDP_lib.htm). Growth increases on average by 1.26 percent. When the capital flows measure is used, the increase is smaller (61 basis points) and no longer significant. If we were to subtract this increase in growth opportunities from our estimate of the total dividend yield change, the drop in the cost of capital must have been economically very small or nonexistent.
Of course, this split-up of dividend yield changes into cost of capital changes and growth opportunity changes may be incorrect if all structural parameters change. In a third experiment, we calibrate the structural model presented in Section II.A to an "average" emerging market before and after liberalizations. Appendix A contains details of the calibration procedure conducted for the capital flow liberalization measure. The output is the six structural parameters driving the present value model before and after the break, which can be used to characterize the dividend yield and log-return process before and after the break. We find a 61 basis point increase in the dividend growth rate (proxied by GDP growth) and a 75 basis point drop in the dividend yield. In the stylized simulations we conducted before, this would suggest a drop in the cost of capital of about 10 to 15 basis points. Indeed, the mean of logged returns drops from 7.16 percent to 7.05 percent, suggesting a very small drop in the cost of capital.
Our main conclusions continue to hold. Dividend yields decrease but not by more than 75 basis points. Our analysis here suggests that it is likely that part of this drop can be ascribed to improved growth opportunities making the actual drop in the cost of capital even smaller.
B. Economic Analysis of Cost of Capital Changes
Whereas the effects of capital market liberalization on the dividend yields seem small, economic integration, as measured by the size of the trade sector, does seem to have a significant effect (both economically and statistically) on the dividend yields. The economic experiment considers the global effect from stock market development, macroeconomic development, and a financial market liberalization.
Although we analyze the coefficients from three different definitions of liberalizations (Official Liberalizations, First Sign, and Capital Flow Breaks), we concentrate our discussion on the First Sign results. The economic impact is summarized in Figure 2 .
Combining the coefficients from Panel E in Tables IV with the crosssectional distribution of the control variables, we find that the dividend yield decreases by 87 basis points. Almost all of this effect is being driven by macroeconomic development and the actual liberalization.15 Taken together, we argue that development has, at most, led to an economically small drop in the cost of capital that is often statistically insignificant. 15 The returns results are hard to interpret given their lack of robustness but, in unreported results, we find that the macroeconomic development indicators continue to suggest a small drop in expected returns of 30 basis points. The credit rating variable implies a 1.6 percent decrease in expected returns. These results are consistent with those reported in Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996a). However, this effect is offset by the financial development indicators and by the financial liberalization indicators, which suggest an overall increase in returns. The stock market development effect is primarily driven by the cross-sectional standard deviation, which experiences a break in its relation with returns postliberalization, and we have shown the returns results lack robustness. (1986) ). The GARCH model is fit, country by country, and often includes dummy variables for regulatory shifts. This type of modeling has many limitations. The volatility process is only affected by past returns-that is, there is no other conditioning information. The parameters of the volatility model are assumed to be constant. Finally, the dummy variable approach lacks power to detect changes when information from only one country is used.
Economic
Other studies rely on an event study methodology (see, e.g., Kim and Singal (1999) and Richards (1996)). Volatility is modeled, following Schwert (1989a, 1989b), using residuals from an autoregressive model for returns controlling for calendar effects. Though this approach pools information from different countries, it does not control for other variables that affect volatility. This approach also ignores the changes in the stochastic process for returns that gradually integrating markets undergo.
We combine both methods and improve the econometric methodology along various dimensions. First, we estimate a time-series model for volatility for each country that allows both the conditional mean and the conditional variance to vary through time. We condition on both world and local information to capture changes in the degree of market integration. This model delivers a timeseries of conditional volatilities for each country as well as conditional correlations and conditional betas of each country's return with the world market return.
Second, and as we discussed in Section III, we use these conditional volatility, correlation, and beta estimates in a pooled time-series/cross-sectional analysis. Although we can only estimate an "average" response to foreign speculative activity that way, the increase in power is essential.
Since our volatility model is fully described in Bekaert and Harvey (1997), we relegate a brief description of the model to an appendix that is available from the authors upon request.
B. Diversification and Liberalization
Table VII presents regressions that omit the control variables.16 The results suggest an indeterminant effect of liberalizations on volatility. In only one specification, First Sign, is the change in volatility significant at the 10 percent level and it is only significant at the 5 percent level when the response is weighted by the foreign ownership variable. This particular regression suggests that volatility increases after liberalization. Table VII analyzes the behavior of correlations with world market returns around liberalizations. In all tests, correlations increase. For example, from PRE to POST for Official Liberalizations, correlation increases by 4.2 percent. This change is significant at the 1 percent level. Economically, the increase in correlation after liberalizations is too small to diminish any diversification benefits. Such benefits are likely large given that the average conditional correlation with the world market return is only 14 percent (see Table II ). Panel B does show that countries which start out with low correlations experience much larger correlation increases.
The final panel examines changes in the beta with world markets. Increased correlations can come about because of cash flow or discount rate effects. In the latter case, we may expect an increase in beta. The results suggest a highly significant change in the beta. In each regression, the change from PRE to POST is significant at the 1 percent level. The size of the increase in beta ranges from 0.06 to 0.105. In the weighted regressions, the beta increases are substantially larger-in one case more than 0.33. Is the increase large enough to substantially impact the cost of capital? This analysis is complicated. Even if the beta with the world increases, this does not necessarily mean the cost of capital increases. The reason is that in the preliberalization regime the world CAPM should not hold. That is, expected returns in a segmented regime are related to the country's variance-not to its covariance with the world. Even if we were to assume that preliberalization emerging markets were integrated with the world market and the world CAPM held, the change in beta of 0.10 would imply an increase in the cost of capital of only 70 basis points (assuming a seven percent world risk premium).
C. Economic Analysis of Volatility, Correlation, and Beta
We repeat the economic analysis conducted on the dividend yields for volatility, beta, and correlation with world market returns (see Figure 2) . Based on the estimates of the volatility model with control variables, we find that annualized volatility slightly decreases (by one basis point). In this case, both the financial and macroeconomic development indicators suggest a considerable decrease in volatility. This is offset by an increase in volatility attributed to the financial liberalization. These results are broadly consistent with those in Bekaert and Harvey (1997) who have a shorter sample and use a different methodology.
Correlation increases by 0.045, and all three categories contribute approximately equally to this increased correlation. Beta increases by 0.12. Similar to the analysis of correlation, financial market development, macroeconomic development, and liberalizations contribute about equally to the increase.
The economic exercise points to an insignificant change in volatility and a small increase in both correlation and beta with the world market. However, the increase in market capitalization to GDP that we use moving from the 25th percentile to the median is very small (2.8 percent to 9.1 percent). If we repeat the analysis using the 75th percentile (2.8 percent to 23.0 percent), volatility shows a more substantial decrease (0.6 percent). The increase in correlations is now 0.076 and the increase in beta is 0.182.
VI. Conclusions
There are many perceptions of the role of foreign speculators in emerging equity markets-many of which are negative. Our research looks at the various ways foreigners can access emerging market equity (ADRs, Country Funds, or direct participation in the local market) and tries to assess the impact on expected returns, volatility, beta, and correlation.
One of the major conclusions of our work is that the capital market integration process reduces the cost of capital but perhaps by less than we expected. In fact, there are reasons to believe that the effect we measure is upwardly biased. We have taken liberalizations as an exogenous event, whereas policymakers would probably choose to liberalize when it is most advantageous to do so. Although policy endogeneity would suggest our estimates are biased upward (see Henry (2000) for a similar point), the effect we measure is less than one percent. A positive effect of the liberalization on the growth potential of the country (as predicted by the new growth theory) should also decrease dividend yields, and we present some evidence in favor of a small growth effect.
In fact, one control variable that is very significant in our regressions is the economic openness of the country, which is known to be a reliable predictor of economic growth, a result confirmed in our data. Although we cannot disentangle the dividend yield changes precisely into the cost of capital changes versus changes in growth opportunities, the fact that dividend yields consistently decrease suggests some (albeit minor) beneficial effects of liberalizations. One macroeconomic variable that may be particularly sensitive to both cost of capital changes and growth opportunities is aggregate investment as a proportion of GDP. Henry (1999) already reports that financial and economic liberalization increases growth in aggregate investment. We repeat our analysis of Table V, regressing the investment to GDP ratio on the liberalization indicator. The results are striking. For the Official Liberalization, First Sign, and Capital Flows, we measure, respectively, 75, 73, and 66 basis point increases in the investment to GDP ratio-all of which are significant at the 5 percent level.
Our analysis details a small but mostly insignificant increase in the volatility of stock returns following capital market liberalizations. Moreover, the effect becomes negative when potentially concurrent movements in the control variables are taken into account. Interestingly, there is only a small increase in correlation with the world market return. Many foreign investors are attracted to emerging markets for the diversification benefits. Although correlations increase after markets open up, the magnitude of the increase is unlikely to deter investors seeking diversification.
Our research comes at a time when a number of countries are pondering the wisdom of further liberalizing their capital markets or, in the case of some East Asian countries, reversing the process. Nevertheless, much research remains to be done. As this paper illustrates, it is extremely hard to identify when market integration really occurs. If we could use returns and other financial data to "date" market integration, we may be able to determine which liberalization initiatives (ADRs, Country Funds, large-scale capital market liberalizations) have proved most effective in bringing about market integration. Ongoing research by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (1998) offers some insight on this important question. 
B. Monte Carlo Study
We first calibrate the model to U.S. data. We fix the first three moments of dividend growth both to match the data and to guarantee reasonable implied moments for dividend yields. We set the unconditional mean of the time-varying expected return equal to 0.10 and its persistence equal to 0.75. Finally, the standard deviation of rt is only 40 percent of that of dividend growth. With these parameters, the model delivers moments within one standard error of the mean, standard deviation, and autocorrelation of dividend growth rates, and the mean and autocorrelation of stock returns. It delivers stock returns that are slightly more variable than the data, but the implied moment remains within a two standard error band of the data moment. Although the dividend yield mean and volatility are not statistically close to the data moments, they are economically of similar magnitude. Further details are provided in Table Al. Table All describes a Monte Carlo experiment that illustrates the relative performance of the two measures of cost of capital changes (average returns before and after the break versus changes in dividend yields) in the context of the present value model. The table is presented in terms of cost of capital decreases; hence, a negative change implies an increase in the cost of capital. We simulate samples of 40 annual observations (which is double the number of observations we have for a typical emerging market) on [Adt, r], but the mean of the rt process permanently changes by two percent (from 10 percent to eight percent) midway through the sample. In population, the change in average returns ought to be approximately 2.19 percent (see footnote 8). The small sample distribution for the change in average simple returns is very spread out in that there is a 10 percent probability of concluding that the cost of capital went up by 5.44 percent or more, even though it actually dropped by 2.19 percent. The low variability of dividend yields implies that they virtually always decrease and the 10 percent quantile is still a 1.43 percent drop in the dividend yield. Panel B illustrates the role of time-varying expected returns. We isolate cases in which expected returns are, at the time of the liberalization, low (left columns) or high (right columns). We define low (high) expected returns as five-year average returns before the liberalization of less (more) than eight percent (12 percent). When returns were already low in the preliberalization period, the drop in the cost of capital is less noticeable. Interestingly, the dividend yield measure remains fairly robust with the difference in mean across the distributions only being 30 basis points. For average returns, on the other hand, the differences are dramatic. In the low expected return case, no drop in the cost of capital is observed on average at all, and the decrease is upwardly biased in the high expected returns case. This is potentially important for empirical work since governments may choose to liberalize when it appears most advantageous to them, such as in times of depressed stock prices. Even then, dividend yields allow a rather accurate assessment of the long-run impact on the cost of capital.
So far we have examined one country at a time. Of course, cross-sectional pooling is what renders power to event studies. Unfortunately, we only have 20 emerging markets. In Panel C, we take our 20,000 Monte Carlo experi-ments and construct cross-sectionally averaged changes in the cost of capital over 20 experiments, yielding 1,000 observations. Although this is an idealized setup, the improvement is dramatic. The 10 percent quantile now suggests a 57 basis point decrease in the cost of capital. Nevertheless, whereas the standard deviation of the returns measure distribution shrinks by a factor of almost four (6.04 percent to 1.27 percent), so does the standard deviation of the dividend yield change distribution, which drops to 12 basis points. The actual change is now bounded between 1.78 percent and 2.56 percent for our 1,000 experiments.
Experiment 2 investigates the effect of changing the mean dividend growth rate, in addition to the change in q. Dividend yield changes now also reflect this improvement in growth opportunities, and overestimate the true cost of capital change. In another Monte Carlo experiment (not reported), we decrease the cost of capital by two percent, but increase dividend growth by three percent. Dividend yields now decrease on average by 4.18 percent, whereas returns decrease on average by 1.19 percent. However, the dispersion is large, with a 10 percent quantile of a 6.64 percent increase in returns. Cross-sectional pooling reduces the 10 percent quantile to only slightly positive changes in average returns, but with the volatility of returns observed in emerging markets much higher than in our experiments it remains unlikely that returns lead to statistically significant results. For dividend yields, the effect of changes in ,u and changes in q is close to additive and the range is very tight.
C. The Cost of Capital and Growth
Our structural model requires the estimation of six parameters before and after the structural break (I,u, p, 2r 2, 2 ,q), characterizing the properties of dividend growth and expected returns. We identify these parameters in a two-stage approach using data on real GDP growth (as a proxy to Adt in the model), log returns (endogenous in the model), and dividend yields (also endogenous in the model). We seek to estimate the mean, standard deviation, autocorrelation of real GDP growth, the mean dividend yield and its autocorrelation, and the volatility of log returns for an "average" emerging market. From the first three moments we can immediately infer the parameters for the dividend growth process. We then calibrate the remaining three parameters for the expected return process so that they match the last three moments. In practice, we conduct an exactly identified simulated GMM estimation with an identity weighting matrix, using 10,000 observations for the simulated sample. Note that we do not use average returns because of the imprecision with which they are measured. Expected returns are inferred indirectly from data on dividend yields, return volatility, and the structural restrictions imposed by the model. We define an "average" emerging market consistent with the crosssectional regression framework. Let us illustrate for GDP growth. A similar exercise is conducted for dividend yields and log returns. We consider a panel regression with the dependent variable as real GDP growth, real GDP growth squared, or real GDP growth times past real GDP growth. The right-handside variables are simply a constant and the liberalization dummy. We run a cross-sectionally pooled regression with heteroskedasticity correction to obtain estimates of the constant and the liberalization effect for each moment. We use the estimated coefficients as our estimates of the corresponding uncentered moments from which we can construct the moments of interest. The regression approach has the advantage of making exactly the same assumptions about the cross section of emerging markets as our main regression framework, including the heteroskedasticity correction. The disadvantage of this approach is that the implied autocorrelation is not guaranteed to be between -1 and 1, and we experienced such a problem with the autocorrelation of the dividend yield for the Official Liberalization measure. We therefore focus the discussion on the Capital Flows measure, although the results for the Official Liberalization measure are qualitatively the same, when we fix the autocorrelation coefficient of the dividend yield at some high number.
The calibrated model fits the data moments very well. By construction, the first three moments of dividend (GDP) growth are matched exactly, as is the mean dividend yield and return volatility. The model has slightly lower dividend yield variability, 1.3 (1.0) percent before (after) the break, than is true in the data, 1.7 (1.2) percent before (after) the break. Dividend yield autocorrelation is slightly higher in the model but the overall fit is impressive. The main output is the estimate of the average decrease in log-returns versus dividend yields. Dividend yields decrease by 75 basis points, average log-returns decrease by 11 basis points.
Interestingly, it very much matters how the expected return is computed. When we investigate the mean of the expected return process (q), it increases from 11.72 percent to 11.98 percent and so does the mean of gross returns, from 13.60 percent to 13.99 percent. The main reason for these large differences between logged and nonlogged returns is of course the tremendous volatility characterizing emerging markets. Fama (1996) 
